Lessons from ASEAN’s Economic Integration by Chareonwongsak, Kriengsak
LESSONS FROM ASEAN’s ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
Kriengsak Chareonwongsak 
Abstract 
ASEAN has been a fast growing 
economic region during the last decade. 
However, it was not founded as an 
economic body as such but as a means 
to stopping the spread of Communism 
within South East Asia. This article 
looks at those factors, which have 
supported this economic cooperation 
such as the emergence of regionalism, 
the emergence of Foreign Direct 
Investment host countries, even the 
Asian economic crisis that have all 
contributed to this economic 
cooperation between the member 
countries of ASEAN. In addition, 
factors that have worked against this 
economic cooperation are also looked 
at in this article. These include factors 
such as the early objectives of ASEAN 
itself, economic dependence on other 
external economies, ASEAN’s lack of 
an  anchor  country,   the   inadequacy  of 
institutions with member countries, as 
well as the differences between ASEAN 
member countries themselves. It 
concludes by suggesting lessons that 
can be learned for other developing 
countries. 
Even though not founded primarily 
and fundamentally as an economic 
region, the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) has in fact been 
a fast-growing economic region during 
the last decade. No doubt a significant 
factor in this economic success has 
been the economic cooperation that has 
occurred between the countries of the 
region. After its founding in 1967 and 
for the next two decades there was 
slight growth only in the economies of 
ASEAN’s member countries. However, 
during the 1990’s, before the region 
entered into its economic crisis in 1997, 
this   regional   economic   cooperation 
expanded  considerably  as   demonstrated
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by its liberalization of trade, service, 
and investment, sub-regional economic 
cooperation, and other collaborations 
in terms of information technology.  
This paper endeavors to study 
lessons derived from this economic 
cooperation within ASEAN. Factors 
that have contributed to or hindered the 
success and failure of regional 
cooperation will be discussed in the 
paper, which will conclude with 
recommendations aimed to help 
policymakers of regional development 
for other developing countries. All these 
recommendations aim to promote a 
sustainable development for each 
nation in the shape of new economic 
and political surroundings. 
Factors that supported ASEAN’s 
economic cooperation 
Economic cooperation between 
Southeast Asian Nations was not the 
main impetus for this bloc during 
the first two decades after its 
establishment (Gramegna, 1997). In 
fact, other internal factors and strategies 
within the individual nations drove 
this regional economy. Abundance 
of natural resources,particularly in 
terms of minerals and forests, as 
well as cheap, quality, and hard 
working labor, which supported 
intensive-labor based industries 
ensured low costs of product-
ion (Daquila, 2002). Other factors 
such   as infrastructure, developed 
with United States support during 
the   Cold   War;   foreign  trade,
 
brought about by a change from import 
substitution to export-oriented industri-
alization; stabilized politics, which 
allowed national leaders to stay in their 
position for a longer period of time; as 
well as the economic strength of each 
country itself also reinforced the 
economic stability of the region 
(Daquila, 2002). 
However, after the signing of the 
Singapore Declaration in 1992, 
economic cooperation within ASEAN 
increased greatly. This change seems to 
have occurred partly as the result of the 
institutionalization of the ASEAN 
summit meetings once every three 
years, the holding of informal summits, 
and the adoption of trade and 
investment liberalization measures 
towards the achievement of the ASEAN 
Free Trade Area (AFTA). AFTA was a 
developing concept arrived at by 
consensus. The tariff reduction process 
is carried out through the Common 
Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT), 
which is reviewed regularly by the 
AFTA Council (Beng, 1997). All 
ASEAN member countries are 
compelled to participate in the CEPT 
scheme.  
Key supportive factors attributed to 
the expansion of ASEAN’s economic 
cooperation 
1) Emergence of regionalism
In the past, economic growth
within ASEAN countries was caused by 
global economic conditions that had no 
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serious competition as well as the 
support of powerful countries in the 
world (Kelly, 2002). At present 
however, developed countries have 
begun to build economic blocs that in 
fact have compelled ASEAN to build 
more regional cooperation in order to 
compete with other regions 
(Nishiguchi, 2002).   
2) Emergence of alternative Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI) host countries
The emergence of alternative FDI 
host countries has brought about more 
competition to try to attract FDI 
(Akraraseranee and Stifel, 1992). Such 
competition became more intense after 
China’s entry into the World Trade 
Organization, which attracted about 
70% of FDI into China and a mere 30% 
into the ASEAN countries (Daquila, 
2002). This situation forced ASEAN to 
develop more cooperation in order to 
attract more investment and also to 
expand the scope of this regional 
cooperation by accepting membership 
of countries such as Vietnam, 
Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia.  
3) Regional economic relationships
Members of ASEAN have had
more increasing economic relationships 
with a stronger network of cross border 
operations and cross border inter-firm 
transactions. Private sectors of ASEAN 
have a greater potential to invest in the 
region, particularly large-sized 
businesses in Singapore and Malaysia 
(Freeman, 2001). ASEAN therefore 
demands a decrease in the cost of these 
transactions (Nishiguchi, 2002). 
4) Asian economic crisis
The economic predicament in 1997
was yet another impetus that forced 
ASEAN to liberalize quickly so as to 
attract investment and thereby aid the 
recovery of the regional economy. 
Policies centered on trade and 
investment liberalization were made by 
many member countries (Lane, et al., 
1999). For example, the allowance 
provided to foreigners to be domestic 
entrepreneurs (business ownership) was 
raised to 100%, particularly in the 
export industry, banking business, and 
financial institutes (due to the effects of 
the crisis in Thailand, Indonesia, and 
the Philippines). Moreover, the crisis 
also triggered ideas of expanding 
cooperation to other countries outside 
the group, for example, Japan, China, 
and  Korea,  entitled  ASEAN+3,  as 
well as building regional financial 
cooperation.  
Obstacles to the development of 
economic cooperation within ASEAN 
Development of ASEAN in the 
first 20 years after 1967 was not as 
successful as that experienced by other 
economic blocs, especially The 
European Union (EU) and The North 
American Free Trade Association 
(NAFTA). There were significant 
factors that interfered with the 
development of ASEAN’s economic 
cooperation such as:  
1) The early objectives of ASEAN
 ASEAN does not in fact 
function  as an  economic bloc  (Frankel 
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and Wei, 1996). When founded, its 
main objective was to be a political 
cooperation to restrain the expansion of 
communism in Southeast Asia, which at 
that time was threatening Vietnam, 
Laos, and Cambodia. Leaders of more 
liberalized countries believed in the 
‘domino effect’, that is, if Thailand had 
become communist, this would cause 
the region to become communist as 
well. The five pioneer countries of 
ASEAN therefore founded it with this 
in mind and consequently, during the 
embryonic period of its establishment, 
they did not pay attention to the co-
development of each of their own 
economies.   
2) Dependence on external economies
ASEAN countries have 
demonstrated a high degree of 
dependence on external technology, 
foreign direct investment (FDI), and 
international financial flows and 
subsequently the economic structure of 
ASEAN’s member countries was highly 
dependent on other countries outside 
the region (Harianto, 1994). Such a 
situation is reflected in the value of 
domestic trade in the region that is quite 
low compared to the value of total trade 
for member countries. Most industries 
in ASEAN are export-based industries, 
established by the FDI of developed 
countries and New Industrialized 
Economies (NIE) (Nishiguchi, 2002) 
and as a result most production aims to 
penetrate large markets outside the 
region. In addition, most export-based 
businesses import from mother 
companies and foreign producers of 
capital goods that are not located in the 
region (Ariff, 1997).  
Economic relationships within 
ASEAN itself are also quite poor 
compared to internal relationships 
within NAFTA and the EU. Regional 
trade is promoted more by Singapore 
and other neighbouring countries with 
the exports of Singapore and Malaysia 
accounting for two-thirds of the total 
exports in the region (Nishiguchi, 
2002). Without trade with Singapore, 
regional commerce would be 2-5% only 
of the total trade of ASEAN. As a 
result, the Common Effective 
Preferential Tariff (CEPT) appears not 
to have had much impact on the 
expansion of exports and economies 
within ASEAN. After the declaration of 
CEPT, regional exports expanded by 
2.9% only, while regional income 
expanded by just 3.1% (Daquila, 2002). 
As Harianto (1994) suggested, the 
ASEAN Free Trade Area appears to be 
only an integrated production base for 
standardized and mature products and 
not a conventional free trade area. 
3) Other external impetus
Most factors supportive of the
development of ASEAN’s economic 
cooperation however, are external. 
These include the expansion of 
Communism, the trade and investment 
policies of Japan, the emergence of 
China all of which brought about a 
redrawing of the map of 
industrialization in East Asia, as well as 
the Asian economic crisis (Atsurou, 
2001). However, most of these factors 
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were external to the region, and 
consequently the development of 
ASEAN has not only been slow but it 
also lacks clear direction. In fact 
changes within ASEAN may be seen as 
response to these external factors only. 
On the other hand, unlike ASEAN, the 
establishment of the EU was rapid with 
a clear direction. It was driven by 
internal factors that were aimed to cope 
with regional competition and to use the 
economy as a tool to solve conflicts 
between Germany and France. In 
addition, all of these external factors are 
not meant to underestimate the impact 
of the Asian economic crisis itself 
(Atsurou, 2001). 
4) Lack of the anchor country
ASEAN lacks an anchor leader, a
large country that can lead member 
countries (Ethier, 1998; van der Geest, 
2002). Unlike ASEAN, NAFTA is led 
by the USA and the EU by Germany. 
Member countries of ASEAN have 
equal status and therefore it is difficult 
to conclude negotiations and conditions 
since there is no one country that has 
adequate bargaining power to force 
every country to follow that condition.  
5) Lack of adequate institutional
strength
The institutes of ASEAN lack 
strength and power, unlike the institutes 
of the EU, independent high authorities, 
whose roles are paramount (Chino, 
2003). For the time being, ASEAN does 
not have an independent, supranational 
body and therefore the common 
positions can only mature through 
consensus with the lowest common 
denominator. Representatives of 
ASEAN are usually ministers from the 
member countries and so its role has 
been limited to ad hoc dispute 
settlement. In the EU however, the 
heads of state or government normally 
meet twice a year together, with the 
president of the commission, as the 
European Council. On the other hand 
the council of ministers of ASEAN 
normally meets once a year only and 
even though this council shapes 
common positions amongst member 
states, it does not have a legislative 
function (Gramegna, 1997).  
Furthermore, the notion of 
constructive engagement encourages 
member countries of ASEAN not to 
meddle in the domestic affairs of other 
member countries. As a result, ASEAN 
countries lack sufficient power to 
coerce other member countries to 
follow group opinion or even to be 
supportive of other countries. The 
military government of Myanmar, for 
example, limits the political right and 
freedom of Aung San Suu Kyi, a 
situation that makes ASEAN look weak 
since it has not been able to pressure 
Myanmar about this issue. However, 
after many other countries in the world 
approached ASEAN, it was compelled 
to form a resolution aimed at forcing 
Myanmar to free Aung San Suu Kyi. 
Such an event had never happened 
before in the history of ASEAN when 
member countries intruded into the 
national issues of another member 
country. 
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6) Differences amongst member
countries themselves
Unlike the fifteen member states of 
the EU, which are all Christian and 
pluralistic democracies, members of 
ASEAN have differences in both 
religions and political systems. 
Members of the EU are all developed 
countries even though the GDP per 
capita of the richest member is more 
than three times that of the poorest. 
Another difference between ASEAN 
and the EU lies in the ASEAN 
economies having differences in tariff 
structures that instigated the Common 
Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) 
scheme in 1993. Although this has led 
to a significant increase in absolute 
terms, intra-regional trade has remained 
at around 25% of ASEAN’s global 
trade (Thongpakde, 2001).  
Moreover, it is very difficult to 
make ASEAN+3 into a currency area. 
Despite member countries of 
ASEAN+3 having many differences, 
guidelines and criteria on just how they 
should adjust their national identities to 
get along well with other member 
countries are not mentioned before 
membership of the currency area 
begins. By way of contrast however, 
EU countries have fewer differences 
than the ASEAN countries, yet new 
members have to meet convergence 
criteria before joining with the EU 
currency area (Ethier, 1998; van der 
Geest, 2002). 
7) Competition between member
countries
Some believe that groups of 
countries that are able to carry out a lot 
of international trade with adjacent 
national locations should be “natural 
trading partners” (Wonnacott and Lutz, 
1989; Summers, 1991; Krugman, 
1991). Such an idea suggests that this 
grouping fits the idea of a free trade 
zone since distant locations can 
increase the cost of transportation and 
consequently bring about less 
international trade. However, even 
though countries in ASEAN are located 
adjacent to each other, the proportion of 
their trade is low – unlike in the EU that 
has a high rate of international trade 
within the European region.  
More significantly though, ASEAN 
countries have seen themselves as 
economic rivals with each other. 
Although they have similar structures 
of production, member countries of 
ASEAN are in serious competition to 
attract foreign investment, which 
prevents them from becoming natural 
trading partners totally. Compared to 
other external trading from the region, 
ASEAN has a lower trade transaction 
level. This may be due to the distortion 
of the trade barrier amongst member 
countries, and the privilege of tariff, 
which causes a high proportion of trade 
between ASEAN and developed 
countries. After the liberalization of 
AFTA, these distortions decreased but 
with a proportionate increase in some of 
ASEAN’s regional trade.  
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8) Stream of bilateral negotiation
Trade liberalization, favoured by a
World Trade Organization agreement, 
has been delayed since such a 
resolution is difficult to conclude. This 
is due to the large number of participant 
countries that argue against such a 
move thereby preventing successful 
negotiations. ASEAN’s member
countries were pushed to liberalize their 
trade according to the AFTA 
agreement, but this eventually proved 
unsuccessful because of the low cost of 
their withdrawal according to the 
AFTA agreement. As a result, some 
member countries did not liberalize 
some of their industries as they were 
expected to do. As a result of the 
ineffectiveness of multi-lateral 
negotiations on trade, some ASEAN 
member countries preferred to negotiate 
bilateral trade, that is, to set the mutual 
free trade zone between two parties 
(Chua Lee Hong, 2001). Undoubtedly, 
member countries have not paid much 
attention to developing cooperation for 
the benefit of ASEAN itself. 
9) Internal resistance from member
countries
Another key obstacle against the 
building of economic cooperation 
within ASEAN is internal resistance 
from member countries themselves. 
Since some advantages are lost because 
of ASEAN’s trade liberalization policy, 
groups of people who have been 
disadvantaged resist the development of 
ASEAN cooperation. These groups can 
include governments who have lost 
income from the collection of tariffs; 
entrepreneurs of domestic industry, as 
well as governments that endeavor to 
protect domestic industries they 
consider to be strategic points or the 
 stability of their nation.  
CONCLUSION
The achievements and failures that 
have occurred in the development of 
ASEAN’s economic cooperation should 
provide lessons for other developing 
countries. In developing economic 
cooperation between any group of 
countries, every member country needs 
to have a clear intention of developing 
relationships with other member 
countries by every means possible. 
They need to have an active goal to 
expand this relationship and to go 
further than the scope of just their 
region. The whole operation should be 
a well-organized process with 
appropriate criteria for each member 
country that may in fact be different for 
each country. Distinguishing several 
levels of policy targets may speed up 
the integration process in a more stable 
manner and may also help to reduce the 
adjustment costs for the different 
member countries (van der Geest, 
2002).  
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